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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Ewing v. State (1921), 18 Ala. A. 166, 90 S. 136; Edwards v. State
(1920), 150 Ga. 754, 105 S. E. 363; State v. Campbell (1921), 182 N. C.
911, 110 S. E. 86.
The language of the amendment prohibits manufacture. This Louisiana
statute permits manufacture for home use, i. e., "home-brew." It is an
interesting question whether the amendment may be construed so as to
permit the manufacture of "home-brew." In all cases where the state
has eflacted a prohibiting law (except Louisiana) there is no exception in
favor of "home-brew." It seems to the writer to be extremely doubtful
whether the general prohibition of the amendment is not being violated by
the Louisiana statute permitting the manufacture of "home-brew by house-
holds." The fact that there are few or no prosecutions for making "home-
brew" is no indication of the legality of such manufacture; it is a matter
of sufferance, tacit permission, but it implies no legality. M. E. C., '29.
CORPORATION - SERVICE OF PROCESS - SERVICE OF PARENT COMPANY
THROUGH SuBsiDiARY.A suit was brought for patent infringement, an
attempt being made to hold the General Motors Corporation liable for the
acts of its subsidiary corporations. The action was brought in Ohio, al-
though the General Motors Corporation is a Delaware corporation which
does no business in Ohio in its own name. However, the latter company
owned the capital stock of the subsidiary corporations which did business
in Ohio; and the advertising and annual reports of the General Motors
Corporation treated the subsidiary companies as mere divisions and ad-
juncts of the parent company. It was alleged that the holding company
controlled and directed the policies and business of the subsidiary companies.
Service was had on the managers of the subsidiary companies in Ohio in
behalf of the General Motors Corporation. On a motion to quash service,
held, that valid service had been made on an agent engaged in conducting
the business of the General Motors Corporation. Industrial Research Cor-
poration v. General Motors Corporation (1928), 29 F. (2d) 623.
A foreign corporation must be engaged in business within a state in order
to be validly served with process. Riverside Mills v. Menefee (1915), 237
U. S. 189. The mere fact that it operates through a subsidiary does not
necessarily subject the parent corporation to the jurisdiction of the state.
Proctor and Gamble v. Newton (1923), 289 F. 1013; Cannon Mfg. Co. v.
Cudahy Packing Co. (1925), 267 U. S. 333. The problem involved where
the presence of the subsidiary corporation in the state is asserted as a
basis of jurisdiction over the dominant corporation is entirely different
from that involved where one seeks to hold the parent corporation liable
for the debts, contracts.or torts of the subsidiary. Ballantine, Parent and
Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CAL. L. RV. 12. Thus, where a foreign
corporation marketed its products through a subsidiary which it com-
pletely dominated through stock ownership and otherwise, but which
maintained a distinct corporate entity, and which did not act as the agent
of the parent but instead bought the goods from the parent and sold them
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to dealers to be shipped directly from the parent, it was said that the hold-
ing company was not doing business within the state and could not there
be served. In that case the parent was sued on a cause of action arising
out of a breach of contract it had itself made and the subsidiary was in
no way involved except as a possible basis for acquiring jurisdiction over
the parent. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., supra. However,
in the Cudahy case the court expressly distinguishes that case from such
a case as the principal one where an attempt is made to hold the parent
liable for an act or omission of the subsidiary.
For the purpose of imposing liability, the corporate identity will be dis-
regarded "where one corporation is so organized and controlled, and its
affairs are so conducted, that it is in fact a mere instrumentality or ad-
junct of another corporation." Industrial Research Corporation v. General
Motors Corporation, supra; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. Co. v. Minneapolis
Civic & Comm. Assn. (1918), 247 U. S. 490. In determining whether such
a situation exists, each case must be considered on its facts, and no general
rule can be laid down. Important evidentiary facts are the identity of
stockholders, identity of officers, the manner of keeping books and records
and the methods of conducting the corporate business as a separate con-
cern or as a mere department of the other concern. Ballantine, Parent
and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CA.L. L. REV. 12. In the principal case, the
subsidiaries were held to be mere conveniences employed by the principal
corporation in the transaction of its business. The chief value of the case
lies in the fact that it holds not only that the parent corporation might be
held liable for the patent infringement of the subsidiary, but that the
presence of the latter in the state is a basis for acquiring jurisdiction over
the former. J. N., '29.
HOMICIDE-CASTLE DocTRINE.-Defendant invited his brother-in-law
home to dinner. While there, both brandishing fire-arms, the defendant
shot and killed the brother-in-law. Self defense could not be made out, for
the deceased was in a defensive attitude. Held, that the "defense of castle
doctrine" does not apply, and the instruction thereon was properly refused,
the deceased having been present by invitation and not as an intruder.
Oney v. Commonwealth (1928), 225 Ky. 590, 9 S. W. (2d) 723.
The universally accepted doctrine has been stated thus: "The dwelling
house of a man is his castle and he may not only defend the same, if neces-
sary or apparently so, against one who manifestly endeavors to enter the
same in a wanton, riotous, or violent manner, or with intent to commit a
felony on him or some inmate of his household or guest, or the habitation
itself, but also against one who is only attempting to commit a misde-
meanor of a forcible entry, even to the extent of killing the assailant if such
degree of force be reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of pre-
venting a forcible entry against his will. State v. Bradley (1923), 126 S.
C. 528, 120 S. E. 240; see also 30 C. J. 83; Bishop, CRIMINAL LAW, (9th
ed.), v. 1, sec. 858. Bishop goes on to say that this defense does not apply
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